University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology

Psychology, Department of

October 1975

An Emotion-Attribution Approach to Moral Behavior: Interfacing
Cognitive and Avoidance Theories of Moral Development
Richard A. Dienstbier
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, rdienstbier2@unl.edu

Donald Hillman
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

John Lehnhoff
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Judith Hillman
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Maureen C. Valkenaar
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub
Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons

Dienstbier, Richard A.; Hillman, Donald; Lehnhoff, John; Hillman, Judith; and Valkenaar, Maureen C., "An
Emotion-Attribution Approach to Moral Behavior: Interfacing Cognitive and Avoidance Theories of Moral
Development" (1975). Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology. 254.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/254

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications,
Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Published in Psychological Review 82:4 (1975), pp. 299–315. Copyright © 1975 American Psychological Association. Used
by permission. http://www.apa.org/journals/rev/ “This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA
journal. It is not the copy of record.”

An Emotion-Attribution Approach to Moral Behavior:
Interfacing Cognitive and Avoidance Theories
of Moral Development
Richard A. Dienstbier, Donald Hillman, John Lehnhoff,
Judith Hillman, and Maureen C. Valkenaar
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Abstract: A theory is presented concerning the impact of attributions about the causes of emotional responses
as they influence self-control in temptation situations. Research is reviewed indicating a high level of adult
sensitivity to external influence in making such causal attributions. Two studies are presented in which the
post transgression emotions of second-grade children are labeled shame (because of being found out) or guilt
(due to the transgression itself); when a similar situation was subsequently represented as safe from detection,
shame-condition children transgressed 60–80% more than guilt-condition subjects. It is suggested that emotional arousal elicited in temptation situations because of past punishment or options that are inconsistent with
the self-image is necessary for inhibition but not sufficient unless attributed to a relevant cause. The literature
on the relative effectiveness of moral socialization techniques is discussed with respect to the theory, and the
relevance to cognitive dissonance and to overjustification approaches to motivation is discussed. An integration
of social-learning and cognitive-developmental theories is approached through explicating the translation of
moral decision into behavior by focusing on the ways that cognition may exert partial control over the impact
of less finely differentiated emotional response, allowing cognitive overrides of contradictory emotional dispositions without eliminating the emotion.
The authors wish to thank Sister Leonarda and Richard Eisenhauer for their kind permission to use the students and facilities of
St. Teresa’s School in Lincoln, Nebraska, and Norris School in Hickman, Nebraska, and to thank the administration of the Lincoln Public
Schools, particularly Research Coordinator Terry Workman, for cooperation in securing subjects for the second study. Thanks are also
due to Monte Page and Bruce Sales for their thoughtful review of the
manuscript, to Shelley Stall and Jackie Kahl for their work in preliminary research as in-booth observers, and to Gail Zimmerman for her
assistance in caring for the twins in Study 2.
Donald Hillman is now at the University of Vermont, and Judith
Hillman is now at Johnson State College.

Most of the modern literature on the development
of conscience or morality is related to one of two major approaches—cognitive, concerned with moral
reasoning and decision processes, or social learning,
concerned with the emotional states and behaviors associated with self-control in the face of temptation.

Although both approaches are supported by the data
of a great many studies, the two approaches remain
essentially unintegrated. We seek to explicate some
of the important steps in the translation of moral decision into moral behavior and to apply that analysis
to an explanation of why certain moral socialization
techniques are more conducive to internalization than
others. Our theoretical perspective is presented in the
early sections of the article; two supporting studies
follow. The emphasis of the final section is on the relevance of the theory to traditional approaches to morality and to the socialization literature.
The theory can be stated in outline as follows:
Behavior associated with self-control in the context of temptation is heavily influenced by negative
emotional states usually characterized as anxiety,
fear, guilt, and/or shame. This emotional mediation
of moral behavior continues into adulthood, when
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the resultant behavior may relate to higher orders
of moral judgment as defined by modern cognitive
approaches to morality. Although the association of
these negative emotional states with decisional and
behavioral processes may take place in part through
mechanisms of conditioning and learning specified
by traditional avoidance learning theorists (e.g.,
Mowrer, 1950), these associations depend heavily
on the causal attributions that are made about the
source of the negative emotions during socialization
experiences. Social and situational influences (often
temporary) play an important role in forming causal
attributions; different physical and verbal socialization techniques particularly provide different information relevant to the child’s causal attributions.
Later, in the face of temptation, the impact of the
emotion response on behavior will be heavily influenced by the still malleable beliefs held about the
causal origins of the emotional response. When the
individual believes detection of transgression is not
possible, a negative emotional response in the face
of temptation is necessary but not sufficient for the
inhibition of transgression. In order for that emotional arousal to serve an inhibitory function, the individual must identify his emotional discomfort as
due to a relevant cause, such as the transgression
per se (and the implications of the transgression for
self-image, etc.), rather than as due to an irrelevant
cause, such as the fear of punishment. With maturity, control of emotional attributions passes from
the socializing agent to the individual and becomes
related to the level of moral development, although
situational and social cues continue to play an important role.

EMOTION ATTRIBUTION
The work of Schachter and Singer (1962) demonstrated that when subjects injected with adrenalin did not anticipate that arousal effects would result, they tended to attribute their emotional state to
the situation, feeling happier or angrier depending on
the specific post injection experimental context. That
study was the first in a series by Schachter, his students, and others that indicated that people are quite
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flexible in the manner in which they make causal inferences about the source and meaning of their emotional arousal.
Subsequent research exploring the implications
of those findings for moral behavior followed the
work of Lykken (1957). Lykken had shown that
psychopathic individuals seemed not to experience
normal emotion-induced inhibitions. Schachter and
Latané (1964) demonstrated that psychopathic criminals (compared to normal criminals) would learn
to avoid shocked errors (compared to nonshocked
errors) in a lever-maze task only after sustaining
arousal from an adrenalin injection. Schachter and
Ono (cited in Schachter & Latané, 1964) found increased cheating by college students who had received the tranquilizer chlorpromazine (compared
to placebo control groups). These studies can be
viewed as evidence of the necessity of emotional
arousal as an important component in the avoidance
of responses with aversive consequences, with an
increase in arousal facilitating that avoidance and
a decrease attenuating avoidance. However, since
only the degree of arousal was manipulated, and not
interferences the subject might make concerning
causal attribution, the necessity of arousal was demonstrated but the issue of the sufficiency of arousal
was not addressed.
By illustrating the role of emotional arousal, these
data provided support for Mowrer’s (1950) two-factor
avoidance model. Mowrer’s model emphasized that
the emotional response that the organism developed
in response to the cues signaling an aversive event
would motivate the avoidance response, which, when
successful, would lead to the reinforcing reduction of
the negative emotional state.1 Emotional arousal in
anticipation of punishment for a potential transgression should, by this interpretation, lead to the avoidance of the temptation behavior. But Schachter and
Latané (1964) speculated that for the psychopath, the
avoidance of behavior with aversive consequences
depended on more than the mere presence of arousal.
1

More modern theorists have extended this perspective,
suggesting that anxiety becomes conditioned specifically to
the “behavioral and cognitive precursors of the act” (Aronfreed, 1968, pp. 54–55).
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Psychopaths experience a high level of physiological
arousal with no apparent subjective emotional distress in response to cues that would evoke an emotional response in normal individuals. Schachter
and Latané suggested that it was the chronic inability of the psychopath to experience his physiological
arousal as emotion that accounted for his moral insensitivity.2 These suggestions approach the perspective proposed in this article, but our view differs by
suggesting that even in temptation situations where
arousal is experienced as emotion, specific causal attributions are crucial in determining the behavioral
outcome.
It was the Schachter and Latané (1964) research
that led to a series of studies by the first author indicating that college-age men and women more often
succumbed to the temptation to cheat when they could
attribute the emotional arousal associated with cheating to a placebo pill, which supposedly had associated emotional side effects (Dienstbier, 1972; Dienstbier & Munter, 1971). Whereas Schachter and Singer
(1962) had demonstrated that external cues are important in allowing the attribution of and experiencing of
artificially induced arousal as specific emotion, the
cheating research demonstrated the reverse—that naturally induced specific emotions could be interpreted
as nonspecific arousal when subjects attributed the associated arousal to a nonemotionally relevant source
such as the placebo pill. Since these cheating studies

2

Suggestions by Mandler (1964) and the theoretical structure proposed by Lazarus (1968) are useful in understanding possible mechanisms to account for the psychopath’s lack
of emotional experience in the face of arousal. Mandler suggested that the childhood of the typical psychopath is characterized by frequent emotional upheaval~ and that the individual might learn to minimize the emotional discomfort of these
frequent traumas by ignoring the physiological signals from
his body, which, if allowed to contribute to a strong emotional
feeling, would greatly accentuate his distress.
Mandler’s suggestions fit well with Lazarus’s (1968) concept of benign reappraisal, the process by which the stress
reaction is reduced by a cognitive reappraisal involving a
lowered assessment of the potential danger in a situation after the individual has adjudged that he is powerless to affect
the outcome.
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are important for the theoretical perspective developed in this article, they are reviewed here in some
detail.
Recruited as participants in a study on the effects of
a vitamin supplement on vision, subjects were given
a vocabulary test as a “delay task while waiting for
the pill to take effect.” Besides anticipating visual effects from the pill, a random half of the subjects were
led to anticipate arousal effects of “a pounding heart,
hand tremor, sweaty palms, a warm or flushed face,
and a tight or sinking feeling in the stomach” (following Nisbett & Schachter, 1966). Control subjects anticipated benign side effects irrelevant to arousal. After the vocabulary test, to validate the potency of the
pill, subjects viewed the auto-kinetic illusion, and
were led to understand that the pill was responsible
for their seeing the immobile light as moving. Thereafter, subjects were given the opportunity to check
over their vocabulary test answers and to see the correct answers. They were informed that the department
developing the vocabulary test was interested in using
it for future prediction of college success, and that the
“board of psychologists” responsible for it would like
to interview any students who did particularly poorly
on the test (less than 20 right). The test was designed
so that less than 1% of college freshmen could attain
that score without cheating.
The period during which the individual could look
over the correct answers to the vocabulary test and his
own answers was also introduced as a “delay period,”
in this case prior to the rating of side effects because
“it was important that the subjects rate the side effects
they might be experiencing just 9 minutes after they
had experienced the visual effects.” The salience of
the side effects expectation was increased for that period by having subjects look over a side effects checklist at the onset of that period. Any cheating that took
place during the delay period could be detected because pressure-sensitive paper (making a second copy
of the answers) was placed under the answer paper
during the taking of the test; the answer paper was removed by the subjects prior to the cheating period, so
that thereafter any changes made on the real answer
paper would not correspond to those on the pressuresensitive paper .
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In the first study (Dienstbier & Munter, 1971)
49% of the subjects who anticipated arousal side effects from their placebo pills cheated, compared to
27% of the control condition, with cheating defined
as changing any answers, This significant difference
became more impressive when it was noted that the
entire effect was due to the male subjects, whose
cheating rates were 56% and 17% in the two conditions, respectively. Follow-up research (Dienstbier, 1972) indicated that women, too, respond to the
arousal placebo with increased cheating if the threat
of the consequences for failure is made less frightening (it appeared that in the original study the more
intense anxiety experienced by women in response
to the threat of being called by the “board of psychologists” interfered with their attending to the pill
side effects). In a second study reported in the same
article, it was further determined that the effect of
the arousal placebo in reducing resistance to temptation was indeed due to the subject’s attributing
specifically to the pill—merely attending to arousal
feelings without having taken the placebo did not
produce the effect.
It appeared that all subjects experienced emotional arousal while confronting the temptation to
cheat, largely as a result of considering the act of
cheating and the potential negative consequences.
But when subjects could attribute the cause of their
arousal to the pill, that arousal ceased to have an inhibiting effect. It is not, in other words, that the subjects in either pill condition experienced more or less
arousal. but rather that the attribution of the arousal
to a neutral source (in the arousal pill condition) defused that arousal, preventing it from having emotional relevance.3
3

There are two lines of evidence suggesting that subjects
make the attributions of emotional causality at a less than verbally conscious level. First, when subjects were interviewed,
none ever indicated conscious awareness of such a decisional
process. (Subjects were completely debriefed and questioned
concerning possible suspiciousness following the cheating
research.) Second, at the end of the cheating period, when
arousal subjects rated the degree to which they experienced
the arousal side effects, the rate of reporting such side effects
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Whereas Schachter and Latané (1964) had speculated that this process in chronic form accounted for
the moral insensitivity of the psychopath, the cheating
studies suggested that the same process could be demonstrated to produce episodes of moral insensitivity in
normal subjects.
The work of Solomon and Wynne (1954) and subsequent researchers emphasized that although emotional arousal was necessary in the acquisition of
avoidance responses, the elimination of overt signs
of arousal was often observed once such responses
had been well learned. Except for the Schachter and
Ono data (cited in Schachter & Latané 1964), which
demonstrated increased cheating with chloropromazine, we would not have anticipated, therefore, that
emotional arousal played any role in moral decision making for normal adults. Yet the cheating results suggested that even for 19-year-olds in temptation situations, the avoidance of transgression is still
heavily dependent on emotional arousal. Additionally, the studies demonstrated that although 19-yearold adults should have had considerable experience
in learning which features of their own behavior
and of the environment lead to negative emotional
arousal, they were surprisingly susceptible to external influences in attributing arousal experienced in
the face of temptation.
But however powerful these data are, they do not
provide the theoretical bridge to our final point. Our
thesis requires that we demonstrate more than the defusing of emotional arousal through attribution to a
non-emotional source in a context as artificial as that
associated with the placebo pill studies, We must demonstrate instead that emotional arousal may be defused

was surprisingly low. (There was, unfortunately, no control
group with which they could be compared on this dimension,
since the benign symptom subjects rated themselves on the
benign symptoms.) It appears, therefore, that although the information concerning expected symptoms is given verbally,
thereafter the very significant impact that these symptom expectations have upon cheating behavior is achieved by processes not apparent to the subject.
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for moral behavior even though still experienced as
negative emotion, through the attribution to an emotion-inducing source that has no direct relevance to
the moral decision.
S O C I A L I Z AT I O N

AND

EMOTION ATTRIBUTION

We speculated that children would be even more
receptive than adults had proven to be to cues that
would suggest different causal attributions for emotional arousal, and that these cues would play an important role in determining the impact of socialization processes. Specifically, if a socialization pattern
left the child with the impression that the cause of his
emotional arousal or discomfort was his own misbehavior, the impact of this internal orientation on the
child’s behavior would be very different from the impact of an external orientation in which equally intense emotion was thought to be caused by fear of
punishment. The latter attribution would be particularly ineffective in situations in which the tempted individual could be certain that detection was impossible.
Even early in their socialization history, most normal children will experience some emotional arousal
following transgression and detection by a disapproving adult. Several features of the situation naturally
lead to that arousal: the child’s knowledge that the
adult disapproves, previous scoldings now recalled,
anxiety over the uncertainty of the outcome, and the
likelihood that the adult will emphasize the discrepancy between the child’s behavior and higher standards. The manner in which the socializing agent responds to the child’s transgression will influence the
causal attributions the child will make about his emotional discomfort. Socialization procedures that draw
the child’s attention to the transgression rather than to
the aftermath (confrontation and punishment) facilitate the attribution of arousal to the act of transgression. Generally, such procedures involve discussions
of the transgression in a manner that does not threaten
the child, so that the child is able to dwell on the transgression itself and the behavioral standards he has violated, rather than on the threat that confrontation offers. Often the self-concept is manipulated (e.g., “you
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are a bad boy”) in relation to the standard or behavior
(“because you didn’t listen and lied”). The attribution
of arousal to the anticipated transgression later leads
the child to avoid the transgression itself. On the other
hand, responses by socializing agents that threaten the
child or that become salient through pain draw sufficient attention away from the transgression so that
the child is likely to attribute his emotional discomfort exclusively to confrontation with the socializing
agent. When later facing a similar temptation situation, a child treated in the latter manner might experience a high level of emotional arousal, but by attributing his arousal to fear of detection and punishment
he would tend to resist temptation only if he believed
that detection was likely.
In our research with children we wished to buttress
our theory by establishing a temptation and transgression situation in which the emotional arousal following detection would be equal for the two groups of
children, with the children assured that future transgressions could not be detected. We then imparted to
the children an internal (due to own behavior) or an
external (due to confrontation) causal attribution concerning the source of that emotional arousal. It was
hypothesized that the children who believed that they
“felt bad” for their previous transgression (internal
orientation, or guilt) would misbehave far less than
children in the same situation who believed that they
“felt bad” because their previous transgression had
been detected (external orientation, or shame).
STUDY 1
Method
In Study 1 of the two studies with children, secondgrade subjects were brought, one at a time, to a “new toy
room” in their school and were asked to keep watching
a slot car go slowly around an oval track during the experimenter’s absence; they were to stop the car with a
control device if the car began to go too fast. Although
the child was given sufficient justification for watching the car, other electrical toys “with loose wires” controlled by a hidden observer4 were started and stopped
according to a schedule to distract the child. If the child
transgressed by allowing himself to be distracted from
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the implied duty of watching the slot car, the observer
caused the slot car to jump the track (the event that was
supposed to be avoided) and simultaneously signaled the
experimenter to return.
Pretending that the slot car was broken, the experimenter asked the child to accompany him to a separate
room, where the independent manipulation was administered: labeling the child’s feelings as due to transgression (guilt) or due to being found out following the
transgression (shame). The child was then returned to
the room, taught to operate the slot car correctly, and assured that this “new” car would not break if it jumped
the track; he was also assured that the door would now
be locked and the experimenter did not have a key, implying that detection of transgression of failing to watch
the slot car would be impossible. The dependent measure was the total time spent not attending to the slot car
during this second watching phase of 12 minutes (with
the experimenter absent). A reliability of .99 was obtained between two observers for five subjects; thereafter one observer was used.
One male and one female experimenter participated,5
each using boys and girls as subjects, so that with the independent manipulation of guilt versus shame, a 2 × 2 ×
2 factorial design was effected.

Results
Results indicated no significant effects for either
the sex of experimenter or children, but the nonsignificant difference between the mean seconds transgressing for the shame condition (164) and the guilt
condition (102) were suggestive. A further analysis indicated that most of the demonstrated increased effectiveness for the guilt manipulation was due to the female experimenter—187 seconds transgressing in the
shame condition, compared to 80 seconds in the guilt
condition, t(22) = 1.91, p < .07, two tailed. It was our
impression that a real difference did exist, despite the
lack of a significant main effect for the shame versus
guilt conditions or an experimenter by condition interaction. It was suspected that the differences between
experimenters were due to their different experience
levels with children (the more effective one was an elementary school teacher and a parent) rather than a
true sex difference.
4 A role
5 A role

filled by the second and fifth authors.
filled by the third and fourth authors.
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The inconclusiveness of the findings of Study 1
led to the changes incorporated into the second study,
which will be presented in somewhat greater detail.
STUDY 2
In an effort to reduce the variations in background
between children in the two conditions and to allow
a matched-pair type of analysis, second-grade twins
were recruited by seeking the cooperation of their parents and of the twins themselves, Except for some minor changes in procedure and script and the participation of only one experimenter (the first author, who fit
the criterion of having sufficient experience with children), the design of the study was essentially the same
as for Study 1. Children were not considered separately by sex, since the results of Study 1 suggested
no sex differences.
Method
The first twin to participate was chosen randomly
and brought to the toy room while the other twin played
quietly with an assistant in the waiting room. The participating twin was seated in front of the booth and was
told that the slot car presently on the track was very old
so it might break if it did fall off the track, but that the
problem with the cars sometimes going too fast was in
the track. The experimenter’s first absence was so that
he could “go to call the man who fixes the toys.” The
scheduled use of distraction toys such as the electric
train “with the loose wires” was essentially the same
as in the first phase of Study 1. Although the criterion
time before the slot car would jump the track and the
booth light would go on for the first twin was 6 continuous seconds of distraction, if the child had not met that
criterion by the end of the 6th minute, the criterion time
was reduced by 1 second for each passing minute of attentiveness of the child. Since the members of each twin
pair tended to act remarkably alike, their first phase participation times tended to be very similar.
Immediately following the child’s transgression, the
experimenter returned. Upon “discovering the transgre
sion and the “broken” slot car, the experimenter asked
the child to accompany him to the adjoining room,
where he identified the twin’s experimental condition
and administered the appropriate manipulation according to the following script (the sections in parentheses
indicate the additions that change the basic guilt script to
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the shame script, or where two sets of parentheses occur
together, the first is the shame section and the second the
guilt section:
I bet you feel a little bad now that (I found out) the
car fell off, I’ve seen other kids feel bad when (someone found out) they weren’t able to do exactly what
they were supposed to do. When the other kids who
tried to watch the car couldn’t, they felt bad (when I
found out) too.
But it’s important that we do stop the car when the
light first comes on, and before it flies off the track, so
we’ll try again with this new car. You won’t feel bad if (I
find this car still) (this car stays) on the track—if (I find)
you’ve done a good job, you’ll feel good, won’t you ?
Have you noticed that when other kids (can show
people that they) have done the right thing, that they
feel good ? And when (people find out) they did things
they were not supposed to, they feel bad, don’t they?
(when someone finds out) (Even if no one ever finds
out) they feel bad for not doing what they were supposed to do, don’t they ?

After returning to the toy room, the child was directly informed that since he now was being taught to
start and control the new unbreakable car, and since the
door would be locked and the experimenter had no key,
that “even if it did fly off the track I’d never find out,
since you could put it back by yourself and I can’t come
right in with the door locked.” Most children spontaneously acknowledged that this was true. With that statement, the experimenter signaled the observer6 to put his
hand over his ears while the final part of the independent
manipulation was administered: “Remember, you’d feel
bad if (I ever found out you did a bad job) (you did a bad
job, even if I never found out). There is no way that I
could find out this time, though.” The experimenter then
left the room, locking the door and very loudly checking
it to make sure it was adequately locked.
A 12-minute period, spiced with the same distracting
toys starting up and the same dependent measure (the
time spent not attending to the slot cars) was identical to
the second phase of Study 1.
Results and Conclusions
Of the nine pairs of twins who came to the laboratory, complete data were gathered for six pairs, Two
pairs were lost because one of the twins failed to follow
instructions by shutting off the slot car so that he would
not have to watch it, One pair was not run because the
twins were hyperactive and inattentive. For each of the
six pairs run, the twin receiving the shame instructions

Figure 1. Seconds transgressing for the members of each
pair of twins according to condition.

transgressed almost twice as much as the twin in the
guilt condition. The average time transgressing was 322
seconds for the shame condition, and 177 seconds for
the guilt condition t(5) = 8.0, p < .001, two tailed. The
regularity of the effect across pairs of twins is illustrated
by Figure 1.
It is apparent that 8-year-old children are sufficiently
cognitively sophisticated so that the differences between
the guilt and shame manipulations are perceived, even
in the face of the anxiety elicited by the confrontation
with a mildly disapproving and strange adult. Additionally, the findings of 60% (Study 1) and 80% (Study 2)
increases in transgression time for shame subjects over
guilt subjects support conclusions from the adult cheating studies—the attribution of emotional causality has a
large impact on the behavior of children in resistance-totemptation situations.
8 Thanks

are due Steve Slane for his faithful and competent filling of the observer role.
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The degree to which the two child studies are acceptable as powerful support of the theoretical development is dependent on several assumptions that
cannot be empirically demonstrated. Although we
endeavored to maintain equal levels of emotional
arousal for the children in the two conditions, and although there are no apparent reasons why the shame
or guilt script variations might have induced different arousal levels, no direct assessment of emotional
arousal was made. Also, we cannot be certain that the
greater effectiveness of the guilt script was not due
to one of the scripts drawing the subject’s attention
to considerations irrelevant to the attribution of emotional arousal. It might have appeared, for example,
that the experimenter was less interested in the behavior of the children in the shame condition. Although
the similarity of the scripts was meant to preclude
this possibility, it is impossible to be certain that the
script differences did not trigger different reactions
between the children in the two conditions. However,
since neither of these two explanations could easily he
used to explain the results of the cheating studies with
adults, the hypothesis involving the causal attributions
of emotional arousal seems the only likely explanation common to both research approaches. Although
the following discussion assumes that the child studies provide strong empirical support for the theoretical developments, we believe that it is possible to
follow and accept the theoretical aspects of our thesis without being totally convinced of the relevance of
the data from the child studies.
One possible approach to explaining the high dependence of our child and adult subjects on external
cues rather than past experience in making causal attributions of emotional arousal is to suggest that this
flexibility is greatest when the emotional state in question is an uncomfortable one. Some support-by-default for this view comes from the emotion-attribution
literature; the impact of causal attribution manipulations has been convincingly demonstrated only with
the negative emotions of anxiety, fear, and startle response (Dienstbier, 1972; Dienstbier & Munter, 1971;
Nisbett & Schachter, 1966; Ross, Rodin, & Zimbardo,
1969; Storms & Nisbett, 1970; Zanna & Cooper,
1974). In the first author’s research, several failures to
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observe the causal reattribution of arousal associated
with emotions not related to fear reinforced this view.
Further support is provided by the research of Lazarus
and his associates (Lazarus, 1968), who have demonstrated a readiness in their subjects to use cognitive
information that allows the reduction of stress.
Another approach to understanding the apparent
ease with which the children accepted the attribution
of arousal to their own behavior or internal causes
rather than to detection or external causes is to focus
on the readiness of children in this age category to accept such internal attributions. Wolman, Lewis, and
King (1971) demonstrated that as children pass from
“young” (ages 5–7) through “middle” (ages 8–9) to
“old” (ages 10–13) categories, they report that the
conditions that stimulate emotions more frequently
come from within themselves. Kagan (1971) has summarized a wide range of literature suggesting that the
child’s capacity for guilt increases most rapidly between the ages of 4 and 10.

RELEVANCE TO MAJOR THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
Social Learning Approaches
Influenced heavily by traditional learning theory
on the one hand, and by the psychoanalytic concept
of identification on the other, the social learning approach to morality has progressed in the direction of
the analyses of those features of the model that facilitate identification and those features of discipline
techniques that facilitate resistance to temptation and
appropriate affect.
Since the impact of modeling and identification research appears to be waning, we will not attempt an
integration of our view with that branch of the social
learning literature.7
7 The modeling literature, typified by the work of Bandura
and his associates (Bandura, 1968) and Sears and his associates (Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957; Sears, Rau, & Alpert,
1965), has never freed itself from the issues of identification
versus simple imitation, and in the 1970s seems to have lost
its appeal as a research area. The failure of many major studies in this area to find convincing evidence of causal links be-
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Instead, our discussion will be concerned with socialization techniques and the impact of those techniques on the affective and cognitive responses that
facilitate resistance to temptation. Several issues in
the social learning and the socialization-of-morality literature will be viewed from our theoretical perspective.
Punishment. As a behavior modification technique,
and as demonstrated in many laboratory studies, punishment (including physical) is often a viable control
technique. That punishment is effective in behavioral
control (so that its various parameters bear analysis) is
seldom questioned, and those laboratory studies that
have compared punished and nonpunished control
groups have generally demonstrated the superiority of
punishment in behavioral suppression (see Johnston,
1972, for a recent review). But the socialization literature based on naturalistic observation in home and
school settings indicates that the use of physical punishment is negatively associated with the internalization of social control (Bacon, Child, & Barry, 1963;
MacKinnon, 1938; Maurer, 1974; Nowicki & Segal,
1974; Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957; Sears, Rau, &
Albert, 1965).
The dilemma of physical or power-oriented punishment being successful in the laboratory and counterproductive in less controlled settings, particularly
as compared to induction, relates to our approach
according to the following analysis. When all other
things are equal, the more severe the punishment, the
more the emotional arousal and the more the resistance to deviation in the future, unless the more intense punishment causes different attributions about
the source of the emotional discomfort associated
with that situation or distracts from other administered messages relevant to emotional attribution. The
first part of that statement is an affirmation of classical avoidance theory—that greater arousal will lead
tween identification and resistance to temptations (i.e., Sears
et al., 1965) has led the author of one significant recent review
to suggest that the evidence linking morality and identification
was meager at best (Hoffman, 1970). While the disinhibiting
effects of a transgressing model seemed established, the inhibiting effects of a self-denying model were not.
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to more resistance to deviation. But, as is also suggested, intense physical punishment should indeed
cause different attributions of arousal from either
mild punishment or other disciplinary techniques
that do not direct attention away from the transgression, If the physically punished individual faces future temptation in situations in which detection
seems unlikely, then we would predict a paradoxical
effect, with more intense punishment or more physically oriented punishment leading to less resistance
to temptation.
Punishment that is love oriented, however,
seems less destructive in its impact on the development of resistance to temptation. There are several
reasons why such techniques are less counterproductive than physical discipline and why they are
found to be positive in some studies, While physical punishment is usually accompanied by parental
expressions of anger, encouraging similar expressions in the child, love-withdrawal techniques are
associated with anger inhibition (Hoffman, 1970)
in the child: the experiencing of anger by the child
suggests that emotional arousal is being attributed
to confrontation with the parent, Additionally, the
love-withdrawal techniques tend to leave the child
in a state of emotional discomfort for longer periods, with the termination of such punishment often dependent on some action or statement by the
child that relates to the child’s initial transgression.
Expressions such as “I’m sorry that I did that” are
emotional attribution statements frequently encouraged by parents in psychological punishment situations prior to the termination of the punishment.
That love-oriented techniques have sometimes been
found to be most effective when practiced by warm
parents (i.e., Sears et al., 1957) may be due to the
child’s finding it more difficult to attribute his discomfort to the warm parents’ behavior, rather than
to his own. The fact that with greater warmth, there
is more love to withdraw in the punishment situation is also relevant.
Due to the unfamiliarity and associated uncertainty that the young subject experiences in the laboratory, combined with (usually, in our view) insuf-
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ficient assurances of the undetectability of deviance,
the laboratory provides neither a setting in which
the exclusive attribution of arousal to punishment
is likely nor one in which feelings of total freedom
from detection are likely. In laboratory studies the
punished child therefore usually appears more selfcontrolled than the nonpunished control. Unfortunately, a complete resolution of this point is not possible by reference to the morality literature, since
researchers seldom attempt to provide evidence that
their children were convinced that their transgressions could not be detected. Given that the laboratory is often quite unfamiliar to the research subjects,
for young children to be secure in their belief of undetectability considerable effort should be devoted
to the staging of experimental situations; if possible,
the impossibility of detection should be articulated
to the child (as in Study 2).
Naturalistic settings often permit the child to
make causal attributions that negate the effect of
punishment and lead to freedom from detection. In
a home or classroom the harshly or frequently punished child has repeated opportunities to make accurate attributions that the negative emotions he experiences are due to confrontation and punishment rather
than transgression and to become certain about when
detection is possible. Those accurate emotional attributions facilitated by repeated experience in natural settings are not conducive to internalization.
With the development of accurate attributions about
the source of negative emotional arousal, either of
two types of results may obtain (probably most such
situations result in some of each of these two processes). The first process has been emphasized by
those social learning theorists who have been heavily influenced by the traditional avoidance model exemplified by Mowrer’s (1950) work, but who must
explain the data that indicate the ineffectiveness of
punishment in natural settings. Simply stated, that
view suggests that the punished child learns accurate
discriminatory’ cues so that no arousal results during transgressions that occur in the absence of punishing agents. While it is apparent that such a process may take place, we would argue that there are a
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great many temptation situations for normal individuals in which arousal is elicited even though the individual is fully aware that detection is impossible;
both the cheating studies and our child studies provided situations designed to make detection appear
impossible, yet arousal and the causal attributions
made about that arousal played a key role in determining the outcome.
We seek what we perceive to be a necessary
middle ground between older theories which emphasize automatic conditioning procedures to the
exclusion of cognitive processes, and more modern
approaches, which emphasize total cognitive control over the learning of contingencies. The older
view (Mowrer, 1950), suggesting a classical-conditioning-like mechanism to account for the attachment of negative emotions to situations and behavior, could not account for data such as that offered
in the cheating studies or the child studies, in which
cognitive interpretations given to subjects relevant
to the meaning of their emotional arousal had important effects. More modern approaches, such as
that of Bindra (1974), suggest that reinforcing or
punishing events do not directly affect the strength
of the preceding response; rather what is learned
are the “contingent relations” existing between the
events of the situation. Bandura (1969, p. 553) suggests a similar relationship in stating that the classical-conditioning-like aversive techniques used in
behavior modification procedures affect the client
only to the extent that he is consciously willing to
recall and revisualize or reexperience the therapy
situation when faced with temptation in later outside situations.
Our view suggests a greater degree of autonomy
between cognition and emotion, with cognition influenced by, but not under the total control of emotional arousal, and emotional arousal likewise influenced by, but not completely controlled by cognition
interpretations. Thus the cognitive knowledge possessed by particularly the very young child that his
emotional upset in the face of temptation stems directly from previous punishment may not eliminate
that emotion when detection is thought to be impos-
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sible; rather, such a causal attribution will make the
emotion irrelevant and will allow the child to act
somewhat as if the emotion were not present. To illustrate this cognition-emotion interaction, consider
behavior in the face of a mild phobia. The fear experienced by an acrophobic adult while climbing
an open stairway may be as intense when the fear
is cognitively perceived to be unjustified (the stairs
are safe) as when it is perceived to be justified (the
stairs may break); yet through moderate fear levels,
such cognitions will determine whether the individual will override his emotional arousal and continue
to climb. We present the acrophobia illustration as
more than a metaphor and suggest that many of the
more important moral prohibitions learned by individuals with well-developed consciences have a
phobia-like character, with emotional arousal elicited even though the tempted individual may cognitively appraise the situation as perfectly safe from
detection. Such an appraisal allows the emotion to
be overridden without being eliminated if the individual attributes his arousal to a fear of detection or
to other causes that may be irrelevant if detection is
impossible.8
Recent research by Loftis and Ross (1974) suggests the possibility of a second effect resulting from
different causal attributions. After the acquisition of
an emotional response, the extinction rate for that response may depend in part on the source to which
the individual retrospectively attributes his emotional
arousal. In their research, a tone was heard while a
shock-induced emotional reaction, as measured by
galvanic skin response (GSR), was conditioned to a
light. When later instructions indicated that the emotional arousal could be attributed to the tone, extinc-

8 An extreme example of an apparently similar process is
found in the work of Fenz and Epstein (Epstein, 1967) with
skydivers. Although emotional arousal as indicated by physiological monitoring remains high as the skydiver gains experience, his view of the sport as not posing objective danger allows the enthusiast to jump. The changing attributions
fostered by experience allow the experience of intense excitement where previously fear had dominated.
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tion of the GSR was faster (compared to a control
group for which the tone was not described as arousing), even though no tone was used during extinction, Thus, although our view emphasizes that emotional arousal will have differential effects depending
on the causal attributions made, we do not exclude
the process of different attributions eventually affecting arousal level, With respect to moral behavior, the two processes should tend to influence responses similarly, with attributions that arousal is
due to irrelevant sources (such as fear of punishment
when detection is not possible) both negating the effect of the arousal and, with repeated experience,
leading to a reduction in emotional arousal as well.
Techniques such as induction (Hoffman, 1970),
which do not depend on punishment, will undoubtedly result in less negative emotional arousal associated with transgression than techniques based on
punishment; but successful induction, involving the
explanation to the child of why certain behaviors
are right or wrong, focuses attention on the behavior per se, so that the arousal that is present during
such socialization episodes will be attributed to the
act of transgression rather than to the threat of punishment. Hoffman’s review indicates that induction
is more effective in moral socialization than punishment-based techniques, even including love-oriented punishment. Our emphasis on the necessity
of arousal for induction to be effective is relevant
to Aronfreed’s (1968, p. 9) suggestion that “available evidence usually points to great discrepancies
between children’s verbal expression of evaluative
standards and their actual behavior in a real social
context.” The data of Henshel (1971), indicating increasing correlations (from fourth to seventh grade)
between honesty assessed verbally and resistance to
temptation in a cheating task, provide the basis for
an explanation of the discontinuity between verbal
expression and moral behavior noted by Aronfreed.
Henshel suggested that behavior is not dependent as
much on simply “knowing” what is right as it is on
“feeling what is ‘desirable.’“ Unless standards become associated with emotional responses, children
will be as free to violate these standards as were the
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subjects in the cheating studies who could attribute
their arousal to a pill.
Guilt and resistance to temptation. A second dilemma from the social learning literature is that although a correspondence is assumed (in most versions of social learning theory) between guilt
(usually as measured by projective techniques) and
resistance to temptation, some studies have failed
to show such a correspondence (Allinsmith, 1960;
Burton, Maccoby, & Allinsmith, 1961; Maccoby,
1959).
Some authors (e.g., Hoffman, 1970) have suggested that one of the major problems with that literature is that researchers have seldom endeavored to measure guilt in relation to the same types
of transgression on which the behavioral measures
are taken. Furthermore, the difficulty of interpreting
projective measures of guilt is often cited. Our approach lends support to that explanation and allows
a further articulation of the importance of measuring guilt and resistance to temptation with respect
to the same transgression. As demonstrated by the
cheating and child research, our approach emphasizes the high degree of dependency on immediate
situational cues in attributing causation of emotional
arousal. Thus it is quite likely that individuals who
make causal attributions about the internal origins of
arousal (guilt) in one situation will find that either
their own past experience or current situational cues
lead them to make more external attributions concerning emotional causality (shame or fear of punishment) in other temptation situations. Significant
correlations between guilt and resistance to temptation should, therefore, be expected only when those
dimensions are compared with respect to the same
behavior. The only study that measured guilt and resistance to temptation with respect to the same type
of transgression found that a significant relationship
did exist (MacKinnon, 1938).
Cognitive Dissonance and Self-Perception
Theory
The changing of the value of certain behaviors
and objects through unnecessarily strong negative
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external inducement (threat) has been demonstrated
by researchers investigating a hypothesis derived
from cognitive dissonance theory. That hypothesis
stated that children who receive a mild threat to inhibit an act will take more personal responsibility
for resisting temptation than will severely threatened children; they will therefore experience more
cognitive dissonance over resisting temptation. Aronson and Carlsmith (1963) and Freedman (1965)
demonstrated that when children were given a mild
threat to not play with a valued toy, they valued
the forbidden toy less (Aronson & Carlsmith) and
played with it less (Freedman) than was the case
under severe threat. The sophisticated control conditions of the Freedman study (finding no threat-effect differences when there was no opportunity to
play with the toy during the threat-relevant period)
allowed the elimination of many potential explanations alternative to the dissonance-derived hypothesis.
A more recent literature has developed indicating similar effects for unnecessarily strong positive inducements (reinforcement). The thinking of
deCharms (1968) on the importance of perceived locus of control in motivation led to research on the
overjustification effect by Deci (1971,1972), Kruglanski, Alon, and Lewis (1972) , and Lepper, Green,
and Nisbett (1973). This research indicated that
when an individual is offered reinforcement for a
task he would have performed without payment, he
acts (in future situations without payment) as if he
were less intrinsically motivated than before the unnecessary payment,
Both the dissonance and the overjustification research provide support for Bem’s (1972) self-perception theory-that individuals tend to consider all
available evidence in assessing the motivation underlying their own behavior, just as an observer
looks for all the forces relevant to another’s behavior
in making attributions about the other’s motivation.
Our approach suggests that the overjustification and
dissonance results are due to the effect that an offer
of tangible reinforcement or threat of severe and tangible punishment has on reducing attributions about
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the internal cause of positive and negative emotions.
But by focusing as it does on the ability to change
causal attributions of emotion associated with and
resulting from behavior after the behavior has been
performed, our approach suggests that reinforcement
or punishment given after the fact will often create
effects similar to inducements and threats made before the fact. This conclusion from our studies with
children is reinforced by the findings on “retrospective misattribution” by Loftis and Ross (1974) cited
earlier. The importance of this extension becomes
more obvious when we consider that socialization
efforts are usually made after some motivational failure has occurred.
As suggested earlier, the extent to which punishment or reinforcement draws attention to itself rather
than to the preceding behavior will be influenced not
only by the specific form of punishment or reinforcement but also by the style of administration and the
situation. Thus while tangible reinforcers, such as
physical punishment, are likely to draw the attribution
of emotional response toward themselves rather than
to the preceding behavior, certain approaches may accentuate that process. Information that suggests that
the administered reinforcement should be sufficient
compensation and an adequate inducement for future
performance should increase the likelihood that pleasure derived from the task itself (from the means, as
well as from the completion) will be attributed instead
to the reinforcement.
This approach may be useful in illuminating an
apparent contradiction in the recent overjustification literature. Unexpected prizes administered to a
group of game-winning students by Kruglanski et
al. (1972) had the effect of reducing liking for those
competitive games (compared to nonrewarded winners), while children who received unexpected prizes
for good drawing in the Lepper et al. (1973) study
did not later behave as if their prizes caused them to
devalue the special drawing task used. From our perspective, the critical difference lies in the changed
attributions resulting from Kruglanski et al. telling
their subjects that they had been promised the rewards prior to the games (which in fact was not true)
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and in giving tangible reinforcers (plastic puzzles),
which were salient during the game ratings because
they were given before the rating. The positive emotional response resulting from playing and winning
the games was apparently partially attributed to the
prizes. In the Lepper et al. study, however, the unexpected reward group was not misled to believe that
their rewards had been previously promised nor were
those rewards salient at the time the dependent measure was taken; their awards had been posted (several days previously) on an “award board” that was
not present in the classroom in which the dependent
measure was taken.
Our approach leads to a theoretical integration between findings associated with achievement motivation
and the overjustification research, an integration very
similar to that which is apparent between the punishment literature (in natural settings) and the dissonance
literature. Research in the achievement area indicates
that while gestures of parental love and affection (nontangible reinforcers that do not draw attention from the
child’s behavior) are related to high achievement motivation in boys, the administration of tangible reinforcers by parents is not associated with high achievement
motivation (Rosen & D’Andrade, 1959; Spence, 1970;
Winterbottom, cited in McClelland, Atkinson, Clark &
Lowell, 1953).

T H E C O G N I T I V E A N D A V O I D A N C E T H E O RY
I N T E R FA C E
Cognitive development theories of morality,
as exemplified by the writing of Piaget and Kohlberg, are too extensive to be reviewed here in detail. Rather, cognitive developmental theory will be
briefly outlined and the relevance of that approach
to the proposed theory will be explicated at a general level.
Piaget (1932) postulated that the development of
the child’s moral judgments corresponds to the development of other more general cognitive capacities. Prior to the development of sufficient cognitive flexibility, the child makes moral judgments
in strictest conformity to established rules, view-
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ing behavior as totally right or wrong, basing that
assessment on the outcome of an act regardless of
the intent of the actor, and believing in the concept
of “immanent justice”—that punishment will automatically and surely follow transgression, with maturity and cognitive flexibility, moral judgments become more flexible, with rules seen as changeable
depending on other constraints of the situation; the
outcome of a specific act has less impact on the assignment of blame than the intent of the actor. In
part, this transition to flexibility is made possible
through active participation in society and through
rule making and changing, allowing rules to be
seen as serving man’s needs. Social participation
also encourages the acquisition of increased empathy through interaction with peers,
Kohlberg (1958) extended Piaget’s approach to a
6-stage sequence, each stage of which is defined by a
different basis for moral judgment. In earliest stages,
avoidance of punishment (Stage 1) and later the definition of right and wrong based on the valence of the
outcome for the actor (Stage 2) prevail. Middle stages
involve judgments based on the maintenance of social approval (Stage 3) and then on duty to laws and
the prevailing social order (Stage 4). Higher stages
are based on an understanding of the social-contract
nature of social and legal systems and respect for the
rights of others (Stage 5) and finally a recognition that
legal and moral principles are often in conflict, resolved through principles of conscience, logical consistency, and mutual trust in fulfilling higher values
(Stage 6).
Neither Piaget nor Kohlberg has extensively addressed theoretical questions of the relationship
of moral behavior to moral reasoning, or of the relationship of affect and emotional arousal to moral
reasoning. Kohlberg (1969) , however, approached
our viewpoint by suggesting that affective responses
would progress developmentally with cognitive responses and that for the higher moral stages, guilt
would be associated with different types of transgression. Thus for a Stage 6 individual, “guilt over
violation of internal principles” would result; for
the Stage 4 individual, guilt would imply “concern
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about one’s responsibility, according to rules”; for
the Stage 3 individual, only shame would be experienced.
Kohlberg’s astute analysis is completely compatible with our orientation, but it is through the emotion-attribution perspective that we can address the
issue of the dynamics that account for this presumed
usual compatibility of affect and moral judgment in
the maturing individual, The key to our explanation
is that temptation situations are basically unchanging as the individual matures through the cognitive
stages postulated by the cognitive-developmental
theorists. That is, even though perceived somewhat
differently with maturity, and even though different responses become available, the basic issues that
lead to the emotional arousal associated with temptation remain essentially the same. It is, of course,
impossible to prove this point, but it is difficult to
name any moral issue faced by a mature adult in any
sphere of personal or professional activity that does
not have an obvious and basic counterpart for a 6year-old child. There are mature and immature forms
of stealing, of being dishonest or disloyal, of hurting others or being unfair, or of being destructive
to property and life. This view is supported by the
moral dilemmas used in the Kohlberg (1958) system
to assess maturity of moral judgment—the situations
can be seen as posing ethical dilemmas to individuals at any stage of moral maturity.
How does this continuity of moral dilemmas provide a mechanism for understanding the (normally)
continuing compatability of moral judgment and its
supportive affect as the individual’s level of moral
maturity changes? A basic tenet of our approach is
that many moral dilemmas evoke a phobia-like response, causing emotional discomfort as the individual begins to seriously consider transgression as
an option. But that emotional arousal will have different meanings (and will affect behavior differently) for individuals at different levels of moral development. Thus one’s stage of moral development
does not determine whether an individual will experience arousal, but rather once such arousal is experienced, one’s stage of moral maturity will influ-
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ence what the arousal means and therefore whether
the arousal is relevant to the available behavioral options. We do not wish to exclude the possibility that
the level of maturity will influence one’s perception
of the situation and that this perception will influence the amount of arousal experienced, but the impact of such initial perceptions on arousal level may
be minimal.
As an example, we might consider the problem of
killing others in a war, assuming a society in which
parental instruction, the major institutions of society,
and the child’s personal encounters with death all create in the child a negatively toned emotional arousal
at the prospect of causing another’s death. Other factors that might support this arousal include the recognition of the extraordinary exercise of power in killing, the irreversibility of death, and the degree to
which the behavior is relevant to the support of or
the negation of self-concept. When ordered to kill in
war time, individuals at different stages in Kohlberg’s
(1958) moral development scheme would act differently. The Stage 4 individual, believing firmly in the
supremacy of the law and the absolute need to uphold
the law, would agree to kill, yet he would experience
inhibiting negative emotional arousal (based on processes such as those discussed earlier), which cannot
be eliminated readily through cognitive control. Unless overwhelmed with negative emotion, his attribution of affect to a fear of killing would be sufficient
to make that negative affect less relevant, allowing
him to kill (just as the shame-oriented child is able to
transgress even when aroused if detection seems impossible, or as cheating is facilitated for the individual who can attribute his arousal to a placebo). With
killing experience, the Stage 4 soldier’s emotional response should decline relatively rapidly (since, as indicated by Loftis and Ross, 1974, the attribution of
arousal to an irrelevant source may facilitate subsequent extinction).
Individuals at Kohlberg’s Stage 6 would initially
experience arousal for the same reasons and in a manner similar to the Stage 4 individual. But principles
based on individual conscience allow more latitude
of outcome. One may hierarchically arrange personal
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values so that killing is required by conscience to defend principles more important that the deaths involved, or one may decide that killing cannot be justified by the principles defended by the war. In the first
instance, the arousal would be experienced as guilt
(the individual assumes personal responsibility for the
decision) over the anticipation of killing, but the attribution of that arousal to the violation of moral principles would not prevent the killing—the arousal would
be of little relevance since other moral principles associated with the nominal purpose of the war have become more important.
The Stage 6 individual who has concluded that life
is more important than those principles defended by
the military action, on the other hand, experiencing his
arousal as anticipatory guilt over the killing, would focus on his arousal as relevant to that behavior. Therefore, the arousal could be experienced as a manifestation of the degree of opposition the individual feels
toward killing and as evidence of the correctness of
the decision not to kill. As the three hypothetical individuals approach their battlefield decisions, increasing
arousal will therefore have different impacts on each.
The Stage 4 individual, feeling his arousal as unwelcome fear, might begin to feel cowardly and ashamed
of his emotional reaction. The first Stage 6 individual,
feeling anticipatory guilt, would feel more confused,
wondering if this increased arousal should be taken
as evidence of the wrongness of killing and hence
of a need for the reordering of those values that favored killing. The second Stage 6 individual would,
of course, become more convinced of the correctness
of his decision not to kill.
Emotional arousal and cognition are thus seen to
interact in a complex manner, with behavioral outcome determined by the outcome of that interaction.
When either is overwhelming, it may tend to dominate despite the counterinfluence of the other, but
in the normal middle ground of life, that mechanism
which permits us to display our humanity (when humanity is defined in the old-fashioned manner as the
dominance of the rational over the appetitive and
emotional) seems to depend heavily on our ability
to experience our emotion as inoperative by attribut-
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ing it to causes not relevant to the present situation.
Tomkins (1963) wrote that it is “one of the major
functions of any negative affect theory to guide action so that negative affect is not experienced,” and
that this represented “affect at a distance” (pp. 320,
321). We would agree, but add that the major function of any theory that seeks to integrate cognition,
affect, and behavior must provide an explanation
of how cognition, more differentiated and complex
than affective responses, may moderate the impact
of emotional arousal on behavior, even while failing
to completely dominate or eliminate these affective
responses.
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